Brújula Logística | JAH Insurance Brokers
Analysis updated as of August 28, 2026
A combination of typhoons, port congestion, omissions, and transshipments is affecting routes between Asia and Latin America.
The main risk is not just delays, but the loss of predictability in the logistics chain. Even if a container is ready, the invoice has been issued, the booking confirmed, and the estimated date set, the cargo may not actually be in transit. That is the current situation in Shanghai, where some container ships are facing wait times of up to 11 days to dock due to accumulated operational disruptions.
Although the problem is occurring more than 15,000 kilometers away from many Latin American markets, its effects are already spreading to Mexico, Central America, and South America.
The question is no longer simply: How long is the delay in Shanghai?
The important question for an importer is:
Hapag-Lloyd reported 35 significantly longer wait times at ports in eastern China for its 35th operational week.
| Port / Operation | Reported wait time |
|---|---|
| Shanghai – Gemini, vessels >366 m | 5–7 days |
| Shanghai – Gemini, vessels <366 m | 8–10 days |
| Shanghai – non-Gemini services | 7–11 days |
| Ningbo – Gemini | 4–5 days |
| Ningbo – non-Gemini | 3–6 days |
| Qingdao | 1–2 days |
The shipping company attributes the increase to the backlog caused by Typhoons Bavi, Dolphin, and Saudel, and anticipated closures in Shanghai and Ningbo between August 26 and 29 due to the latest weather system.
But on August 28, the threat became a reality: Saudel made landfall in Zhejiang, first in Taizhou and later in Wenzhou, accompanied by heavy rains and suspensions of train and ferry service.
In Shanghai, several terminals also temporarily suspended container pickup and drop-off operations in anticipation of the typhoon’s arrival.
In other words: the system is still feeling the impact.
Because Shanghai is not just another port in the global maritime network.
In 2025, it handled more than 55.06 million TEUs, remaining the busiest container port on the planet for the sixteenth consecutive year. Yangshan—precisely one of the areas currently affected by delays—accounted for more than half of that volume.
This means that when Shanghai misses berthing windows, the problem doesn’t end when the port reopens.
It’s similar to a highway that remains closed for several hours:
when it finally reopens, all the backed-up vehicles try to move forward at the same time.
In maritime transport, this phenomenon is known as vessel bunching: several ships arrive outside their original time slots and compete for berths, cranes, yards, and operational capacity.
That’s why a one- or two-day disruption can take considerably longer to clear from the network.
Here is one of the most important points we found.
Hapag-Lloyd’s operational update does not focus solely on services to Europe or the United States.
In its specific “Latin America Services” section, the shipping line lists multiple adjustments to the ANDEX Sling 1 (AN1), ANDEX Sling 2 (AN2), and Asia Mexico Express (TPM/AME1) services.
These include:
For example, in AN1, vessels such as the Humboldt Express, ONE Sapphire, ONE Sphere, and Manzanillo Express are listed as skipping Shanghai and redirecting cargo to hubs such as Hong Kong or Busan.
In AN2, the list is even longer: several vessels are scheduled to skip Shanghai and unload their cargo there via Busan for a subsequent connection.
The Asia Mexico Express service also skips Shanghai and Ningbo and uses Busan to transship cargo.
These networks connect Asia with Latin American ports such as Manzanillo, Puerto Quetzal, Buenaventura, Callao, and Guayaquil, among others.
The cargo does not necessarily remain stationary in Shanghai for 11 days.
It may: wait → be reallocated → miss its original vessel → travel to another hub → wait for a new connection → continue on to Latin America.
And each additional link introduces a new variable.
Let’s imagine an import shipment from China to Latin America.
The original route was:
Supplier → Shanghai → ship → Latin American port → ground transportation → distribution center
After a disruption, it may become:
Supplier → Shanghai → wait → ship change → Busan/Hong Kong → transshipment → new ship → Latin American port → ground transportation
The container continues its journey.
But the supply chain is no longer the same.
| Event | Possible consequence |
|---|---|
| Wait for berthing | ETD/ETA change |
| Omission of Shanghai | Rebooking or new connection |
| Cargo transshipment | Departure on a later vessel |
| Additional transshipment | Increased handling and transit time |
| Ships out of rotation | Lower reliability of subsequent itineraries |
| Equipment repositioning | Reduced container availability |
| Concentrated arrivals | Possible congestion at subsequent ports |
| Changing ETA | Inventory and planning issues |
| Longer transit times | More capital tied up |
That’s why an 11-day port wait doesn’t necessarily mean an 11-day final delay.
The impact may be less. Or considerably greater.
It all depends on whether the cargo stays on its vessel, misses a connection, is transshipped, or enters a new rotation.
The most striking figure is probably not the 11 days. It’s this:
That is the container ship capacity currently waiting to berth at ports around the world, according to data from Linerlytica cited by various specialized sources.
It is the highest absolute volume ever recorded. It even exceeds the approximately 4 million TEU observed during the peak congestion of 2022.
But here it’s worth making an important clarification.
Not necessarily.
| Indicator | 2022 | August 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Congested capacity | ~4.0 M TEU | ~4.3 M TEU |
| Global fleet | ~25.3 M TEU | ~34.4 M TEU |
| % of the affected fleet | 15.7% | 12.6% |
In other words: 2026 marks an all-time high, but not a proportional record.
There is more trapped capacity, but there is also a considerably larger global fleet.
This prevents us from falling for alarmist headlines.
However, it also doesn’t mean the problem is any less serious for an importer whose goods happen to fall within that 12.6% of affected capacity.
The congestion comes at a time when maritime transport punctuality was already deteriorating.
Sea-Intelligence reported that global schedule reliability fell to 56.4% in July 2026, 6.1 percentage points lower than the previous month.
This is the lowest level of 2026. And when a vessel was late, its average delay was:
the highest level recorded since January 2024. In other words:
And that happened before the full impact of Saudel was reflected in the August statistics.
The market to South America was already under pressure even before this latest disruption.
In mid-August, S&P Global reported rates of approximately USD 5,600–6,000 per FEU from North Asia to the west coast of South America.
Its PCR 29 assessment reached USD 6,200 per FEU, while market participants expected rates of USD 6,500–7,000 during the third week of the month.
For the east coast of South America, the PCR 31 rate stood at around USD 6,000 per FEU on August 11.
What’s interesting is the cause.
According to sources consulted by S&P Global, the rise in rates was not solely due to a surge in demand.
It was related to:
congestion + weather disruptions + rebookings + blank sailings + vessels out of position.
In other words, less effective capacity was available.
At the same time, Maersk announced an increase in the Peak Season Surcharge for shipments from much of Asia to Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, effective August 20.
That doesn’t mean that all China–Latin America rates will automatically go up.
But it does show that transportation costs are responding to a much more strained environment in terms of capacity and reliability.
On August 27, Drewry’s World Container Index fell 1%, to USD 4,473 per 40-foot container.
How can a global index fall while pressure on routes to South America is increasing?
Because a global index doesn’t necessarily reflect your specific route.
Routes such as Shanghai–Los Angeles, Shanghai–New York, or Shanghai–Rotterdam may evolve differently from a Shanghai–Buenaventura, Shanghai–Callao, or Shanghai–Santos operation.
Don’t manage an Asia–Latin America route by looking solely at a global freight rate index.
The relevant information should be:
Origin + destination + carrier + service + space + connection + equipment + week of departure.
Congestion of this kind may not cause any physical damage.
The container may arrive just fine.
But if it arrives:
- 5 days late.
- 10 days late.
- 15 days late.
And that’s when other costs come into play:
And here lies a very important distinction from an insurance perspective.
The Institute Cargo Clauses (A), widely used as an international benchmark in cargo insurance, stipulate that losses, damages, or expenses caused by delay are excluded even when the delay stems from an insured risk.
At the same time, the clauses themselves provide that coverage may remain in force during certain delays beyond the insured’s control, diversions, forced unloading, reloading, or transshipment, subject to their terms and conditions.
These are two different concepts:
The fact that coverage for the goods continues during a delay does not mean that the economic loss caused by that delay is automatically covered.
That is why companies that are particularly sensitive to delivery dates should review whether they need, in addition to traditional cargo insurance, specific solutions for the risks of logistical delays.
Waiting for “Shanghai to clear up” is not a strategy.
Here are some actions that supply chain teams can implement right away.
Categorize shipments by impact:
🔴 Critical: raw materials, minimum inventory, contractual commitments, or seasonal merchandise.
🟠 Important: Can withstand a few days’ delay.
🟢 Flexible: There is sufficient inventory or leeway in the schedule.
Not all shipments require the same response.
The conversation with the freight forwarder or shipping line should include:
Is the vessel calling at Shanghai?
Are there any confirmed omissions?
Was the shipment rebooked?
Did the transshipment port change?
What is the next confirmed connection?
Is the container already loaded?
Is there a new ETA or just an estimate?
An ETA without context can create a false sense of accuracy.
When a port becomes congested, shifting cargo to a neighboring port seems logical.
But Ningbo also experiences delays of up to 6 days for certain operations.
An alternative is only better if:
there is space + equipment + connectivity + inland capacity + a real difference in total transit time.
When transportation reliability declines, operating with inventory levels designed for a “perfectly punctual” supply chain becomes risky.
The right question may no longer be:
“How much inventory do I want to have?”
and instead become:
“How many days of disruption can my operation absorb?”
For refrigerated, pharmaceutical, perishable, or goods sensitive to humidity and temperature, a longer transit time warrants additional checks.
Check:
Not afterward.
Confirm:
insured value, route, declared goods, coverage purchased, deductible, and exclusions.
And if the financial impact of a delay could far exceed the physical damage to the goods, specifically analyze that risk.
| Variable | Current Situation | Level of Attention |
|---|---|---|
| Shanghai | Up to 11-day wait | 🔴 High |
| Ningbo | Up to 6 days | 🔴 High |
| Port omissions | Confirmed on several services | 🔴 High |
| Additional transshipments | Hong Kong / Busan, among others | 🟠 Medium-High |
| Overall reliability | 56.4% | 🔴 High |
| Average delay for late ships | 6.06 days | 🔴 High |
| Global capacity congestion | 4.3 M TEU | 🔴 High |
| Rate pressure Asia–South America | High | 🟠 Medium-High |
The alert level is an editorial interpretation by Brújula Logística based on the analyzed conditions and is not a classification issued by the sources.
The next few days will be particularly important.
Typhoon Saudel has already passed the Chinese coast and will continue to weaken, but the true indicator for international trade will be how quickly Shanghai and Ningbo manage to clear the backlog of ships.
That’s why we should keep an eye on four signs:
1. Whether waiting times at Yangshan decrease.
2. Whether shipping lines stop announcing new cancellations for Shanghai and Ningbo.
3. Whether AN1, AN2, and the Asia–Mexico services resume their original schedules.
4. Whether rates to the west and east coasts of South America are no longer driven by space constraints.
The return to normal weather conditions does not necessarily mean an immediate return to normal operations in the supply chain.
The congestion in Shanghai offers a deeper lesson for Latin American companies.
For years, we’ve built supply chains obsessed with reducing inventory, shortening lead times, and eliminating idle capacity.
But when global logistics lose predictability, efficiency without resilience becomes vulnerability.
An importer cannot control a typhoon.
They cannot control when a terminal suspends operations.
Nor can they prevent a shipping line from skipping a port to get back on schedule.
What they can control is:
how well they know their route, how much safety stock they maintain, what information they require from their suppliers, which risks they transfer, and which plan they activate when the ETA is no longer reliable.
Because perhaps the most important question this week isn’t:
But rather:
Sources consulted: Hapag-Lloyd Operational Update Week 35; Maersk Operational Advisories; Sea-Intelligence Global Liner Performance; S&P Global Commodity Insights; Drewry World Container Index; Linerlytica; Shanghai International Port Group; Shanghai Municipal Government; Reuters; MasContainer.
Information updated as of August 28, 2026. Weather conditions, lay times, itineraries, rates, and shipping line decisions are subject to rapid change. References to insurance are for informational purposes only; applicable coverage depends on the specific terms of each policy.